This paper studies the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. Using European Union Household Budget Surveys and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices data, we construct householdspecific price indices and reveal the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe. Over the period 2001-15, the consumption bundles of the poorest deciles in 25 European countries have, on average, become 11.2 percentage points more expensive than those of the richest deciles. We find that ignoring the differential inflation across the distribution underestimates the change in the Gini (based on consumption expenditure) by almost up to 0.04 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this change is large enough to alter the inequality ranking of numerous countries. The average inflation effect we detect is almost as large as the change in the standard Gini measure over the period of interest.
Introduction
Heterogeneous changes in consumer prices have become prevalent in recent decades. If the variation in expenditure shares of households and price changes is systematic, price changes may contribute to economic inequality, a situation which goes unnoticed by using a common consumer price index (CPI). In this paper, we construct household-specific price indices in order to capture the par-ticular inflation experience (the effective inflation rate) of each household and highlight the role of income dependent inflation rates on inequality.
For the period 2001-2015, our results show that, on average, across 25 EU countries, the aggregated effective inflation rate for the lowest decile was 11.2 percent higher than for the top decile. This finding implies an average yearly inflation rate differential of 0.76 percentage points. We show that this "pro-rich inflation" translates into a considerable increase in inequality that is not reflected in standard measures of inequality. Particularly, ignoring the differential effective inflation rates across the distribution causes underestimation of the changes in the consumption expenditure Gini of almost up to 0.04 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this effect is sizeable enough to move the placement of numerous countries in the ranking of inequality. We find that, while the average change in the standard Gini across 25 EU countries is 0.020 over 2001-15, the average magnitude of underestimation arising from ignoring the differential effective inflation rates is 0.016.
We are not the first to highlight the possibility of differing effective inflation rates for various household groups. One strand of the literature explores heterogeneity in the effective inflation rates across the distribution as well as across other demographic characteristics such as age, household size, gender, etc. (see, e. g., Michael 1979; Hagemann 1982; Amble and Stewart 1994; Garner et al. 1996; Hobijn and Lagakos 2005; Leicester et al. 2008; Murphy et al. 2008; Oosthuizen 2013) . More relevant to our work, some scholars investigated the distributional consequences of the phenomenon of the differential effective inflation rates (see, e. g., Muellbauer 1974; Cage et al. 2002; Crawford and Smith 2002; Garner et al. 2003; Goni et al. 2006; Cravino and Levchenko 2017) .
Recent contributions have substantially improved our understanding regarding the evolution of inequality. 1 Yet, the possibility that the differential effective inflation rates could obscure the picture drawn by usual methods of measuring inequality has not received much attention in the recent literature, particularly for developed economies. Recently, Arndt et al. (2015) and Beck (2015) focus on some African countries with a particular emphasis on the 2008 Global Food Crisis. Due to data limitations, they explore only three categories ("Core Food", "Noncore Food" and "Non-Food") in their analyses. While Arndt et al. (2015) find that accounting for heterogeneity in the effective inflation rates yields a higher inequality in Mozambique, results by Beck (2015) indicate heterogeneous effects across multiple African countries. When it comes to the recent work on developed economies, focusing on the U.S., Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) investigates inflation inequality by exploiting 19 categories. Their findings suggest that, over 1987-2001, there is no persistence in household-specific inflation rates but, cost-of-living of poor households seems to be highly sensitive to gasoline prices.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze this phenomenon in 25 EU countries with as much as 30 expenditure categories over the post 2000 period. 2 It is worth noting that our analysis is mainly concerned with price variations in the upper-level expenditure categories (between-category). There is a growing body of literature using supermarket scanner data to investigate similar issues among specific lower-level categories (within-category), particularly for the US. See, e. g., Argente and Lee (2017) , Jaravel (2017) , and Faber and Fally (2017) . Given the lack of comparable data for a wide set of European countries, within-category effects are beyond the scope of our paper. Moreover, scanner data cover only part of households' expenditure baskets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology of constructing household-specific price indices and briefly discusses alternative approaches. Section 3 introduces the datasets used in this study. Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
The departure point of this study is that expenditure shares usually vary across households and prices vary across items. If poorer (or richer) households spend a higher fraction of their income on particular groups of goods, and if the prices of those groups of goods are increasing rapidly, then inflation affects various households in different ways. A common CPI (that is uniform across households) cannot accurately capture this heterogeneous impact. Consider the simple example of luxuries and necessities. Since the work of Ernst Engel (1857) , it has become well-established that poorer households tend to spend a higher fraction of their income on necessities; whereas, richer ones can afford to spend more on luxury items. If the prices of necessities are increasing faster than the CPI, poorer households experience a larger decline in their real income.
In order to capture specific inflation experience of each household, we need to construct household-specific price indices. Before describing our methodology, it is useful to touch on some points in the literature of price indices. Two most commonly employed price indices in the calculation of inflation are the Laspeyres and Paasche indices. Equations (1) and (2) provide their formulae (see ILO 2004) .
In Equations (1) and (2), q i t is the price index of household at time t, s i g,t is expenditure share of household i on good g at time time t, p g,t is the price of good g at time t. The simple difference is that the Laspeyres Price Index takes the expenditure shares from the base period (t 0 ) as opposed to Paasche Price Index which takes expenditure shares from the last period (t). If households minimize their expenditure given a certain level of utility, it is reasonable to expect that households substitute away from goods with higher prices. This is the very reason that the Paasche Price Index is regarded as the lower bound of the cost-of-living in the last period, whereas the Laspeyres Price Index is considered as the upper bound of the cost-of-living in the base period (see Schultze 2003) .
We have access to the annual expenditure shares of households for each good category in 2010 together with annual prices of those good categories over 2001-15 (see Section 3 for details of the dataset). 3 Our preferred household-specific price index combines the Laspeyres Price Index and the Paasche Price Index. We use Equation (2) to calculate the Paasche Price Index of household i over 2001-10 where t 0 is 2001 and t is 2010. For the period of 2010-15, we use Equation (1) where t 0 is 2010 and t is 2015 to calculate the development of a Laspeyres Price Index. Subsequently, we merge the two indices (Paasche Index for 2001-10 and scaled Laspeyres Index for 2011-15) to complete the calculation of our household-specific price indices.
The household-specific price index that is constructed by combining the Laspeyres Index and the Paasche Index allows us to track the changes in the cost-of-living of 2010 over the period of 2001-15. The Paasche Index, which is calculated over 2001-10, corresponds to the changes in the lower bound of cost-ofliving of 2010. Over 2011-15, the Laspeyres Index does not account for substitution effects and overstates the changes in the cost-of-living of 2010. Given our main finding of pro-rich inflation, this does not undermine our results. If the rich are more able to substitute away certain goods in response to a price increase, their inflation exposure over 2011-15 is overestimated. This occurs because we do not capture the substitution effect over this later period which is possibly favoring the rich. Therefore, if anything, our results regarding pro-rich inflation most likely give the lower bound. In this framework, our assumption regarding substitution ability of rich versus poor households is crucial. In Appendix B, we provide a simple model with Stone-Geary preferences. Our model supports the assumption that richer households have a greater ability to substitute away from certain goods in response to a price increase.
Investigating heterogeneity in the effective inflation rates across the distribution for such a large set of countries has intensive data requirements. In some cases, scholars rely on only Laspeyres or only Paasche Index (see, e. g., Oosthuizen 2013; Beck 2015) . An ideal approach would be to observe expenditure shares in each year and update category weights accordingly to get closer to the true cost-of-living as in, e. g., Crawford and Smith (2002) , Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) , Leicester et al. (2008) . 4 Alternatively, if expenditure shares were available at the beginning and at the end of the period, using Fisher Index (that is the geometric average of Laspeyres and Paasche Index) would be a close approximation of the cost-of-living (see Garner et al. 1996; Goni et al. 2006) . Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to use either of the approaches. 5
Data
The primary data set used in this study is the European Union Household Budget Surveys (HBSs). They are conducted in all EU Member States with the aim of calculating national weights for the CPI and Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). These surveys are nationally representative and collect detailed 4 Sturm et al. (2009) apply the changes in annual HICP weights to the observed consumption expenditure shares in 1999 to produce annual observations for expenditure shares of different household groups and use chained Laspeyres Index. This procedure still keeps relative expenditure share positions of different household groups the same. Hence, using this approach would not have an impact on the main results of our analyses. 5 An alternative may be to use a Young Index (that is q i t = ∑ g∈G s i g,t ὔ p g,t p g,t 0
) as in Arndt et al. (2015) .
It is difficult to relate the Young Index to a Paasche Index or a Laspeyres Index (see ILO 2004) . We produced equivalent results (not reported here) using a Young Index. expenditure information for each household. Variables are harmonized across countries in order to calculate aggregates at the EU level. Although the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat, has been conducting and publishing main aggregates of the surveys every five years since 1988, only the 2010 wave of microeconomic data is available for researchers. The 2010 wave incorporates data for 26 countries with an effective total sample size of over 270,000 households.
HBSs, however, lack information on prices. Therefore, we exploit a second data set, the HICP, provided by Eurostat. HICP contains country-year observations of a comparable measure of the changes in the prices of goods and services in the European Union with respect to a particular base year. Although the time series starts in 1996, a significant amount of data were missing until 2001. Therefore, this study only uses the price data between 2001 and 2015. For ease of exposition, we normalize the price of each goods category to one in 2001, which is immaterial for the calculation of decile-specific inflation rates below.
Some problems that we encounter in linking HICP to HBSs are worth mentioning here. The first problem is to construct consistent expenditure categories across countries that match available price data. HBSs contain a comprehensive coverage of expenditures on many aggregation levels, represented by number of digits in the variable codes. For example, the 2-digit category "Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages" is split into two 3-digit categories "Food" and "Nonalcoholic Beverages". The 3-digit category "Food" is further split into 4-digit categories such as "Bread and Cereals", "Meat", etc. As mentioned above, one of the purposes of HBSs is to calculate weights for HICP. For this reason, the breakdown of consumption expenditure categories is identical in both data sets. Thus, mapping HICP data to HBSs does not require any additional procedure. However, even after 2001, HICP data is not available for all years at each aggregation level. This makes it impossible to use the most disaggregated categories when calculating expenditure shares. We are able, however, to partition the total consumption expenditure of each household to 30 expenditure categories (a combination of 2-digit and 3-digit categories) on which price data is available. Additional information on these 30 categories and their construction can be found in Appendix A ( Table 4 ). The second problem is that for Croatia, most of the time series of the price data begins in 2005. Because, in this case, it was not possible to select 2001 as the base year for Croatia, we have dropped it from our analysis. Ultimately, our final data set incorporates expenditure data of 30 categories for households in 25 EU countries together with the prices of these categories from 2001 to 2015. The list of 25 countries can be found in Appendix A (Table 5 ).
Results

Pro-rich inflation in Europe
This section provides evidence of pro-rich inflation in Europe. To begin, Table 1 presents the evolution of prices. Numbers reported in the table are unweighted means of the percentage increases in prices with respect to a base year across 25 EU countries. Between columns 1 and 3, the period of interest is split into three intervals and the percentage increase in the price of the corresponding category is reported with respect to the beginning of the interval. The last column provides the overall increases in prices from 2001 to 2015.
The first row of Table 1 reports the average CPI across countries. The average price increase for all goods and services across Europe between 2001-15 is 44.68 %. Categories that can naively be classified as necessities (i. e., the ones concerning food and housing) have experienced larger price increases, on average. For example, between 2001 and 2015, price of "Water supply and misc. services" (044) has increased by 137.73 %, "Electricity, gas and other fuels" (045) by 106.21 %, "Actual rentals of housing" (041) by 69.74 %, "Food" (011) by 47.54 %. Conversely, price increases in luxury-type categories, such as "Recreation and culture" (09), "Glassware, tableware and household utensils" (054), "Purchase of vehicles" (071) have stayed below the common CPI. Figure 1 plots the price increases of 30 expenditure categories (see last column of Table 1 ) against the unweighted average of aggregate expenditure shares of the same categories across 25 countries, between 2001-15. The red line parallel to the x-axis represents the simple mean of the common CPIs (last column of the first row of Table 1 ) and the red line parallel to the y-axis represents the mean of the average aggregate expenditure shares. Figure 1 is informative in two dimensions. It provides evidence on the relative price increases and the relative size of the expenditure share for each category. For example, take "Food" (011). The aggregate average expenditure share across Europe is around 16 %. Comparing this to the straight y-line, one can conclude that relative share of "Food" in household budgets is well above average. Its price has increased slightly faster than the common CPI (red y-line). The price of "Tobacco" (022), on the other hand, has tripled, but its expenditure share is below average.
We may note that our expenditures do not include household interest expenses (e. g. on mortgage). This is in line with the standard calculation of inflation rates. While changes in real interest rates have redistributive effects on creditors and debtors, inclusion of those effects would not only require information unavailable in household budget surveys, but would also destroy comparability with usual inflation rates. So far, we have ignored the fact that expenditure shares vary with household income. To capture this phenomenon, Figure 2 takes ten largest expenditure categories 6 and illustrates their expenditure shares across consumption expenditure deciles. Consumption expenditure deciles for households are constructed on the national levels, using household consumption, adjusted by applying the modified OECD equivalence scale to account for heterogenous household sizes. Reported expenditures are simple means of expenditure shares of deciles across all 25 countries. Items depicted in red (left panel) experienced a price increase above the common CPI, whereas items in blue (right panel) had a price increase below the common CPI for the corresponding categories over the period 2001-15. The darker red (blue) the item gets, the higher (lower) the price increase has been. The ten largest expenditure categories sum up to approximately 65-70 % of the total expenditure across deciles. Close to 60 % of the poorest decile's expenditure is exposed to a price increase above the common CPI; this share for the richest decile is slightly below 40 %. Analyzing categories one by one reveals some important information regarding the source of this differential. Expenditure shares of "Food" (011), "Electricity, gas and other fuels" (045) and "Actual rentals of housing" (041) are monotonically declining from lower to upper deciles and their prices have been increasing above average. Conversely, "Recreation and culture" (09) and "Purchase of vehicles" (071) constitute higher expenditure shares for richer deciles and their price increases have been below average. These five expenditure categories are potential drivers for pro-rich inflation in Europe. (Table 4 ). Items represented in red (blue) had a price increase above (below) the common CPI over the period 2001-15. The darker red (blue) the item gets, the higher (lower) the price increase has been. A simple conclusion of this figure is that around 65 % of the expenditure basket of the poorest decile have been exposed to a price increase above the common CPI. The richest decile, on the other hand, has only seen around 50 % of its basket's price increasing faster than average.
In order to further investigate the contribution of different categories to prorich inflation, in Figure 4 , we graph the difference between expenditure shares of the richest and the poorest decile for 30 categories (as simple averages of 25 countries) over the prices of the corresponding categories in 2015. Although Figure 2 is informative across all the deciles, Figure 4 has the advantage of not being limited to ten largest categories and explicitly illustrating the expenditure share differentials between the richest and the poorest deciles. (Table 4 ). For legibility, we do not show the labels of some of the categories. Figure 4 highlights some of the previous findings. "Food" (011) is likely to be an important contributor to pro-rich inflation mostly due to the expenditure share differentials (because its price has only increased slightly above the common CPI). Although "Electricity, gas and other fuels" (045) exhibits a lower expenditure share differential (compared to (011)), it has been exposed to a price increase well-above the common CPI. In a similar fashion, it is possible to interpret the contribution of other categories to pro-rich inflation.
Our analysis continues with the point estimates of the differences in the effective inflation rates across deciles. Here we construct and make use of householdspecific price indices. We average the household-specific price indices (q i,j,k,t ) in each decile j of each country k at time t to compute q j,k,t . For each country and decile, we calculate the simple difference of this measure between 2001 and 2015.
Δq j,k = q j,k,2015 − q j,k,2001 (3)
Note that q j,k,2001 equals 1 for each country and decile using 2001 as the base year. Hence, Δq j,k corresponds to the percentage points (or percentage) increase in the effective inflation rate of each decile in every country between 2001 and 2015. Subsequently, we run a standard t-test between Δq j,k of each decile j where j = 1, 2, . . . , 9 and Δq 10,k across all 25 countries (k). In other words, we compare the increases in the effective inflation rates of each decile with the 10 th decile across countries. Table 2 presents the results.
Point estimates are consistent with the trend observed in Figure 3 . The effective inflation rate is monotonically increasing as we move to poorer deciles. Between 2001 and 2015, the expenditure basket of the poorest decile in each coun- try became on average 11.2 percentage points more expensive compared to the richest decile. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 % level. The third row in Table 2 translates the total differences into implied average yearly differences. On average, the inflation rate of the poorest decile's basket exceeded the richest decile's basket by 0.76 percentage points, while the average common CPI was 2.67 %. It appears that persistently low CPI observed in Europe masks large relative differences in effective inflation rates across the distribution. Next, we return to the issue regarding the substitution ability of rich and poor that is pointed out in Section 2. As explained there, the expenditure minimizing behavior of households ensures that the substitution effect is captured until 2010. Therefore, if we were to analyze effective inflation rate with prices over 2001-10 and the expenditure shares of 2010, results could be treated as the changes in the minimum-cost-of-living of 2010. However, our price data extends to 2015. If the rich are more able to substitute away from goods in response to a price increase, as our model in Appendix B implies, not capturing the substitution effect between 2010-15 causes a stronger overestimation of the effective inflation rate for the rich and thus renders our point estimates as the lower bound. For example, suppose there has been a substantial increase in the prices of food between 2010-15. Given the finding of our model, the rich can substitute more costly food with other categories more effectively (e. g.; recreation and culture, beverages etc.) and maintain the same level of utility. Since our approach cannot account for substitution over the 2010-15 period, if anything, the effective inflation rate of the rich is overestimated.
Finally, we investigate whether our results are only picking up on certain shocks in particular countries or years. We graph the evolution of the effective inflation rates of the poorest and the richest deciles in all countries across 2001-15. We compute the effective inflation rates of deciles as the simple mean of household-specific price indexes of the corresponding decile in a given country. The results are presented in Appendix C (Figure 8 ). The aggregate trend found in this appendix holds for almost all countries. Portugal and Italy are notable exceptions. The differences in the effective inflation rates of the richest and the poorest deciles are increasing over time. Therefore, we conclude that our results are the outcome of a recent trend in Europe.
Implications for the measurement of inequality: A thought experiment
For the final part of the analysis, we conduct a thought experiment in order to evaluate the implications of pro-rich inflation on the measurement of inequality.
Suppose that, for all households in our sample, the 2010 nominal consumption expenditure was constant across the period 2001-15. Starting from this point of comparison, how would consumption inequality be affected, if we account for the different evolution of prices by applying household-specific price indices? Our strategy is as follows. Let C C i,k,t denote the consumption expenditure of household i in country k at time t deflated by the common CPI:
where C N i,k,2010 is the nominal consumption expenditure of the same household, q k,t is the common CPI of country k at time t and m(h i ) is the household equivalence scale. 7 The function f : R N + → R + maps the consumption values into an inequality index (e. g., Gini index). Then, inequality in country k after applying the common CPI to nominal consumption expenditure values of households is given by f ( ⃗ C C k,t ), which is our baseline inequality measure. Here, ⃗ C C k,t denotes the vector of country k's household incomes, C C i,k,t . Note that f ( ⃗ C C k,t ) is constant across the period of interest. Our thought experiment assumes C N i,k,t = C N i,k,2010 over 2001-15. Then, the only time varying term in the calculation of C C i,k,t is q k,t . Given that inequality measures are mean independent, our baseline inequality measure for each year is the consumption expenditure inequality in 2010.
Subsequently, we calculate consumption expenditures of household i in country k at time t deflated by household-specific price index q i,k,t according to the following formula.
In Equation (5), q i,k,t is the price index of household i, at time t, in country k that is calculated according to the methodology described in Section 2. Inequality in country k after deflating nominal consumption values with household-specific price indexes is given by f ( ⃗ C HH k,t ), where ⃗ C HH k,t is the vector of all real household consumption levels, C HH i,k,t . Finally, the difference between two inequality measures at time t yields the change coming from ignoring the heterogeneity in the effective inflation rates. (Table 5 ). Figure 5 presents the evolution of Change k,t over 2001-15. If the pro-rich inflation is a general trend in Europe and the gap in the effective inflation rates between rich and poor is increasing over time, as we found in the previous section, we should find a positive and increasing difference between f ( ⃗ C HH k,t ) and baseline inequality measures f ( ⃗ C C k,t ). Indeed, in all of the countries, except Italy and Portugal, the Gini coefficient is higher once the household-specific price indices are accounted for. Results reveal that in most of the European countries, inequality measures that ignore the effective inflation rate differentials across the distribution yield an underestimation of the change in inequality over the period 2001-15. The magnitude of Change k,t is generally rising over time, as seen in Figure 5 . (Table 5 ). Notes: The Adjusted Gini Index is calculated after correcting nominal consumption expenditures of households in 2010 by the benefit (or disadvantage) derived as household-specific price indices decreased (or increased) compared to the general CPI during the period 2001-2015. The adjusted Index equals the Gini index in column 2, plus the inflation effects indicated in Figure 5 .
Furthermore, we explore the magnitude and cross-country heterogeneity of Change t . We graph Change k, t at 2015 (last data points of Figure 5 ) in Figure 6 . Over the period of interest, the impact of the differential effective inflation rates on the Gini coefficient is substantial and peaks for Cyprus at around 0.04. Table 3 presents baseline inequality measures f ( ⃗ C C k,t ) and The Adjusted Gini Indices f ( ⃗ C HH k,t ) by country. Cross-country heterogeneity in magnitudes of the errors are large enough to change the inequality ranking of numerous countries. See the fourth column in Table 3 for adjusted Gini indices. For example, although Italy is considered the sixth most unequal country on the baseline list, it moves to the tenth position after accounting for the error in the adjusted index. Portugal, the second most unequal country, moves to sixth position on the modified list.
Whether pro-rich inflation leads to more unequal distributions will depend on the extent to which national redistribution policies react. It is conceivable that countries with a stronger pro-rich inflation had more progressive policies favoring poorer households which compensated for the inflation effect. If compensating policies were in place, we should expect that countries with strong pro-rich inflation had a more negative (or less positive) development of the Gini coefficient that is calculated without consideration of asymmetric inflation. Therefore, the correlation between the Gini adjustment due to inflation effects and the development of the ordinary Gini should be instructive. Because the European HBS that is used in this paper contains consumption data for 2010 only, we rely on the available development of the income Gini (Eurostat 2017) instead of the consumption Gini to check for a possible correlation with the amount of pro-rich inflation. Figure 7 illustrates the results. For each country in our sample, the y-axis measures the difference in the Gini between 2001 and 2015. This Gini relies on disposable income, and the change captured here ignores household-specific inflation. On the x-axis, we plot the change in the Gini that would have resulted from inflation effects only, as reported in Figure 6 . From this exercise, we find an insignificantly positive correlation. This suggests that the inflation effect on the distribution identified above has not been compensated by a systematic income development. Figure 7 is also helpful to provide a context to interpret the absolute changes in Gini due to pro-rich inflation. It illustrates that, while between 2001 and 2015 the ordinary Gini on average increased by 0.020 points, the average effect of inflation was only slightly lower, around 0.016. The inflation effects were almost as important as the changes in the income Gini arising from the actual development of incomes.
In the literature on inequality measurement, it is argued that the Gini coefficient is overly sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution (Atkinson (Table 5 ). In the main dataset, the income Gini of 2001 was missing for Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia. We proxied it with the income Gini of 2000 for Latvia and Malta. The closest available income Gini data for Slovakia and Cyprus is 2005. Therefore, we excluded them from this figure. 1970, p. 256). Conversely, the variance of logarithms is known to be more sensitive to the changes at the tails. In order to make sure that the trend we found is robust to the use of the inequality measure, we repeat the exercise by taking the variance of logs as our inequality measure. In the interest of space, we only report the equivalents of Table 3 and Figure 6 . Results are reported in Appendix D (Table 7 and Figure 9 ). Although there are small changes in the rankings of some countries, our main conclusions are robust.
Cross-country heterogeneity in magnitudes, presented in Figure 6 , raises the question about the sources of the differential amount of pro-rich inflation. Why are some countries more affected than others? Given the absence of pro-rich inflation in Italy and Portugal these countries deserve special attention. Although it is difficult to fully partial out the reasons for these two exceptions, it seems that the main drivers of pro-rich inflation ("Food", "Actual rentals of housing", "Electricity, gas and other fuels") are either not operative or counteracting each other. In Italy, prices of both "Food" and "Actual rentals of housing" move together with the common CPI over the period of interest. In Portugal, on the other hand, above average increase in the prices of "Actual rentals of housing" and "Electricity, gas and other fuels" seem to be counteracted by the below average increase in the price of "Food".
When it comes to electricity, gas and fuels, price changes partly are the result of (environmental) policies and general taxation. In Germany, for example, the average electricity price for households has increased by 118 % between 2000 and 2019. During the same period, taxes and (environmental) charges included in the price have grown by 208 %. At the same time, the cost of production and distribution has increased by only 65 %. 8 Indeed, a recent literature has increased awareness that green policies may have undesired distributional concerns. See OECD (2006) or Neuhoff et al. (2013) . A full accounting exercise that clarifies to which extent policy influences or general market trends has been responsible for the development of pro-rich inflation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Conclusion
Given the fact that expenditure shares vary across households and prices vary across items, this paper highlights the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. By its very nature, the common CPI does not capture the differential effect of such a variation across households. Combining the European Union Household Budget Surveys (HBSs) and the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) data from Eurostat, we build a data set with 30 expenditure categories for households in 25 EU countries together with prices of these categories from 2001 to 2015. Subsequently, we construct household-specific price indices in order to account for the effective inflation rates of each household in our sample.
Our analysis suggests the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe over the period 2001-15. Our point estimates reveal that the poorest decile has seen their consumption bundle becoming 11.2 percentage points more expensive than the richest decile's; this translates into, on average, a 0.76 percentage point yearly difference. Our analysis highlights the importance of the substantial increase in the prices of "Food" (011), "Actual rentals of housing" (041) and "Electricity, gas and other fuels" (045) as some of the main drivers of this phenomenon. Among the 25 EU countries we investigate, every one of them, except for Italy and Portugal, have experienced this trend, albeit with different magnitudes. Furthermore, we explore the implications of pro-rich inflation on the measurement of inequality. Our thought experiment indicates that accounting for the household-specific price indices increases the consumption expenditure Gini by up to 0.04 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in the magnitude of this change is large enough to affect the inequality ranking of numerous countries. The average effect of inflation on the Gini (0.016 points) is almost as important as the average change in the usual Gini (0.020 points) across 25 countries between 2001 and 2015. This paper does not provide a causal explanation for the source of the crosscountry heterogeneity in pro-rich inflation. Exploring the specific channels that drive such a variation across countries, we believe, is an important area for future research. Moreover, as emphasized in the first section, our analysis only accounts for between-category variations in expenditure shares and prices. Using Nielsen data, an expanding body of literature investigates the same question by exploring within-category variations for the US. It would be interesting to see how incorporating the within-category variations might change the outcomes found in this paper.
Finally, this paper may also explain the high degree of public interest in distributional issues on continental Europe, although many economic studies based on common consumer price indices for recent decades find only limited increases in income inequality in European countries.
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Appendix A A.1 Data preparation
A.1.1 Construction of consistent categories from HBSs
As mentioned in Section 3, HBSs contain consumption expenditure data in many aggregation levels which are represented by the number of digits in the variable codes, ranging from the 2-to 5-digits. For example, the variable representing the consumption expenditure on "Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages" is 2-digit. Subcategories of the 2-digit level of aggregation, naturally, include 3-digit categories (e. g., food, non-alcoholic beverages). Although it would be ideal for the sake of precision, it is not possible to employ categories more disaggregated than the 3-digit ones used because there is a significant amount of missing price data.
A serious flaw in 3-digit categories is that in approximately 9 % of the observations, 3-digit categories do not add up to their corresponding 2-digit aggregate. If, for example, the sum of the 3-digit category "Food" and the 3-digit category "Non-alcoholic Beverages" do not add up to their 2-digit aggregate "Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages", it is natural to expect that sum of all 3-digit categories would not add up to the total consumption expenditure. One approach would be to work with only the twelve 2-digit categories of the survey. However, because using the most disaggregated categories whenever possible increases precision, we deal with this issue by scaling up the 3-digit categories proportionately such that they will add up to their 2-digit aggregate.
In the HICP data, unfortunately, prices are not fully available on the 3-digit level. Therefore, we investigate every 3-digit category to see the extent of missing price data. If the number of missing data points is too large such that an imputation could create meaningless results, we use the 2-digit aggregate for that particular strand. For example, just like HBS data, the HICP data splits the 2-digit aggregate "Education" into 3-digit categories such as "Primary Education", "Secondary Education", etc., and reports prices both on the 2-digit and 3-digit level. If price data on the 3-digit level is missing in a significant number of country-year observations, we collapse that strand to its 2-digit aggregate and only use the 2-digit level in the analysis. If there are relatively few missing observations, then we impute them. Details of the imputation procedure are provided in the next section. Table 4 presents the 30 expenditure categories and their codes. Table 5 contains the list of 25 EU countries analyzed, along with their abbreviations.
A.1.2 Harmonised index of consumer price data
While preparing the HICP data, we encountered two main challenges. First, as it was mentioned in the previous section, there are missing country-year price observations after constructing 30 expenditure categories. We therefore imputed missing country-year observations as follows: -3-digit category "Hospital Services" (063) Footwear 041
Actual rentals of housing 042
Imputed rentals of housing 043
Maintenance and repair of the dwelling 044
Water supply and misc. services 045
Electricity, gas and other fuels 051
Furniture and furnishings, carpets and other floor coverings 052
Household textiles 053
Household appliances 054
Glassware, tableware and household utensils 055
Tools and equipment for house and garden 056
Goods and services for routine household maintenance 061
Medical products, appliances and equipment 062
Out-patient services 063
Hospital services 071
Purchase of vehicles 072
Operation of personal transport and equipment 073
Transport services 081
Postal services 082
Telephone and telefax services and equipment 09
Recreation and culture 10 Education 111
Catering services 112
Accommodation services 12
Misc. goods and services -3-digit category "Telephone and Telefax Services and Equipment" (082) data is missing for Latvia in 2014; it is proxied using Latvia's 2013 price.
It is important to note that the fraction of proxied country-year price observations is a mere 0.002 %. Moreover, the mean expenditure fraction of main problematic 3-digit category "Hospital Services" (063) across countries is about 0.02 %. Therefore, we are confident that proxying missing price observations does not have a serious impact on our results. A final challenge to deal with is the 3-digit category "Imputed Rentals of Housing" (042). Naturally, HICP does not provide any information on prices of this category. One immediate resolution for this problem would be proxying the prices of this category with prices of the 3-digit category "Actual Rentals of Housing" (041). However, by definition, values in "Imputed Rentals of Housing" (042) do not imply an actual expenditure; values purely represent the rental price of the dwelling as if it is consumed by its owner. Therefore, a price increase would not imply a decline in the real expenditure of the household who owns the dwelling. In order to neutralize the effect of this category, we assume that the price of "Imputed Rentals of Housing" (042) has not changed with respect to the base year. The fraction "Imputed Rentals of Housing" (042) in total expenditure across deciles is not large enough to explain away our findings. Table 6 presents the fractions. For this reason, we believe, this assumption is not biasing our results. Finally, one should note that imputed rentals would not be available for three countries.
Appendix B B.1 A simple model using Stone-Geary preferences
We construct a simple model based on the stylized fact that poorer households spend a higher fraction of their income on necessities than on luxuries. Moreover, we provide a simple intuition for this fact. Following that logic, the model implies that richer households can more easily substitute away certain goods in response to price increases. Consider a representative household with a Stone-Geary utility function in an economy which consists of two goods: necessities (q n ) and luxuries (q l ). The household maximizes U = β n ln (q n − γ n ) + β l ln(q l )
over q n and q l such that the budget constraint p n q n + q l = y is satisfied. In this specification, γ n indicates the subsistence parameter of necessities (subsistence parameter of luxuries is assumed to be zero). Let p n be the price of necessities relative to luxuries and y is the nominal income of the household. Finally, β n and β l are preference parameters. We assume β n > 0, β l > 0 and β n + β l = 1. Typical FOCs yield the following demand functions: q * n = γ n + β n p n (y − p n γ n )
q * l = β l (y − p n γ n )
These demand functions are simple and intuitive. A household first sets aside enough income to purchase a subsistence level of necessities, then allocates the rest of its income, depending on prices and preference parameters. Following this, we derive the optimal expenditure share of necessities in total demand. s * n = [γ n p n + β n (y − p n γ n )] [γ n p n + β n (y − p n γ n )] + β l (y − p n γ n )p l (10)
Given β l > 0, an increase in income causes a higher increase in denominator due to higher scaling factor (β n + β l > β n ). Hence, s * n y < 0. Intuitively, each household has to spend on necessities at least as much as the subsistence level, which is a constant. As the subsistence level-income ratio decreases in income, richer households spend a lower fraction on necessities, given that luxury goods are at least marginally desirable (β l > 0).
Another implication of the model is that richer households have a higher ability to substitute away certain goods in response to a price increase. Let the price elasticity of demand of necessities be as follows: ϵ n = q * n /q * n p n /p n = q * n p n q * n p n = −β n y p n γ n + β n (y − p n γ n ) = −β n y p n γ n + β n y − β n p n γ n (11)
Note that |ϵ n | < 1. Hence, |ϵ n | y > 0, which means that the price elasticity of demand for necessities is increasing in income. The intuition behind this result is as simple as the previous one. The household can only substitute the expenditures that is left after setting aside the subsistence level. Given that poorer households are left 
